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The Persuasive Effect of Privacy Recommenders

The Persuasive Effect of Privacy Recommendations
for Location Sharing Services
Bart P. Knijnenburg
UC Irvine
bart.k@uci.edu
ABSTRACT

Several researchers have recently suggested that in order
to avoid privacy problems, location-sharing services
should provide finer-grained methods of location-sharing.
This may however turn each “check-in” into a rather
complex decision that puts an unnecessary burden on the
user. We present two studies that explore ways to help
users with such location-sharing decisions. Study 1 shows
that users’ evaluation of their activity is a good predictor
of the sharing action they choose. Study 2 develops
several “privacy recommenders” that tailor the list of
sharing actions to this activity evaluation. We find that
these recommenders have a strong persuasive effect, and
that users find short lists of recommended actions helpful.
We also find, however, that users ultimately find it more
satisfying if we do not ask them to evaluate the activity.
Keywords

Privacy, information disclosure, decision-making,
personalization, recommender systems, user experience.
INTRODUCTION

Location-sharing services (LSS) enable users to share
their location with their friends, and many have some
additional benefit such as discounts or recommendations.
The adoption of “geosocial services” is however low
(Zickuhr, 2012), and research suggest that users are
plagued by privacy concerns that cause them to limit their
location-sharing (Page, Kobsa, and Knijnenburg, 2012).
Recent research has suggested that giving users finegrained control over their disclosure should reduce their
privacy concerns (Consolvo, Smith, Matthews, LaMarca,
Tabert, and Powledge, 2005). But this turns locationsharing into a rather complex decision that puts extra
burden on the user (Compañó and Lusoli, 2010).
Arguably, then, we should help users in this decision
(Knijnenburg and Kobsa, 2013). One way to do this is to
frame the decision in a way that matches their evaluation
of the activity. The question “What do you think about
this activity?” is arguably easier to answer than the question “How do you want to share this location?” Moreover,
if this evaluation is strongly related to users’ sharing
behavior, we can use it to recommend a (restricted set of)
sharing action(s).
This paper presents two studies that explore such privacy
recommendations. The first study develops a set of rec-
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ommenders that can infer the preferred sharing action
from users’ evaluation of their activity. The second study
tests the impact of these recommenders on users’ behavior
and satisfaction. We present the results and implications
of the two studies here; we refer the reader to our manuscript for a complete account of the study procedures and
an overview of related work (Knijnenburg and Jin, 2013).
STUDY 1: POTENTIAL FOR ADAPTATION

Our first study is an online user experiment to test the
hypothesis that users’ evaluation of the activity is a good
predictor of users’ sharing behavior. We recruited 100
participants (44 females, median age group: 26-30) using
Amazon Mechanical Turk. We restricted participation to
US workers with a high “worker reputation” and used a
number of quality checks to assure careful participation.
Procedure

Participants were asked to imagine using an LSS called
“HotSpots”, which recommends locations to visit based
on previously visited locations and also allows users to
share their location on Facebook. We then showed
participants 10 scenarios (see Knijnenburg and Jin, 2013)
and asked them to choose one of the following 8
disclosure actions (based on Duckham and Kulik, 2005;
Li and Chen, 2010; Tang, Hong, and Siewiorek, 2012):
A1.
A2.
A3.
A4.
A5.
A6.
A7.
A8.

Fully use the system
Restrict Facebook posts to friends that are nearby
Restrict Facebook posts to certain friends only
Restrict Facebook posts to only share city
Restrict Facebook posts to only share city block
Use the system for recommendations only
Turn the system to “private mode” (anonymous)
Turn the system off

Finally, participants chose one of the following 10
evaluations of the activity (based on Kairam, Brzozowski,
Huffaker, and Chi, 2012; Sleeper, Balebako, Das,
McConahy, Wiese, and Cranor, 2013):
E1.
E2.
E3.
E4.
E5.
E6.
E7.

is exciting
is interesting for others
makes me proud
makes me look interesting
needed a good recommendation
is private
embarrasses me

Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Workshop on HCI Research in MIS, Milan, Italy December 15, 2013
1

Knijnenburg et al.

The Persuasive Effect of Privacy Recommenders

E8. isn’t useful for everyone
E9. doesn’t really represent me
E10. may have unintended consequences when shared
Results

Table 1 shows that there is a strong relation between the
disclosure action and the evaluation of the activity. Given
the evaluation, it is thus possible to recommend an action
to the user. For instance, if we recommend only the mostselected action for each evaluation, we are recommending
the “correct” sharing action to the user 43.2% of the time,
which is considerably higher than the 12.5% we would
get by recommending a random action. For practical use
this is not very accurate, but if we recommend not one but
a small set of actions, this set would contain the “correct”
option more often than not. For example, if we
recommend the dark gray cells in Table 1, we can get
81.5% recall with 2.3 actions on average per evaluation.
Increasing the number of recommended actions to just
under 4 actions on average per evaluation (dark and light
gray cells in Table 1), we can get 95.1% recall.
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8

E1 E2 E3 E4 E5
34 88 14 25 24
6 25 1
6
6
5 16 6
9
6
8
1 11 6
1
0
3
4
1
1
2
5
0
1 23
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

E6
0
3
17
4
2
112
80
34

E7 E8 E9 E10
0
1
1
1
0 32 0
4
3 41 1
8
2 10 0
2
1
1
1
5
17 58 16 36
18 20 19 40
14 27 4
26

Table 1. The co-occurrence of actions and evaluations. Gray
cells show possible action recommendations for each reason.
STUDY 2: TESTING THE RECOMMENDERS

Based on the results of study 1 we can create a system
that first asks the user to evaluate the activity and then
recommends a subset of the sharing actions that users are
likely to choose. Two questions need to be answered
when designing such a “privacy recommender”:
How many actions should it recommend? Recommender
systems researchers have found that list length is an
important determinant of user satisfaction (Bollen,
Knijnenburg, Willemsen, and Graus, 2010). In our case, a
longer list of recommendations would be less restrictive
and would have a higher accuracy, but may not help the
user enough in terms of simplifying her decision.
How should it present recommendations? The system
could hide actions that are not recommended, thereby
reducing visual clutter but also increasing the risk that the
user cannot find her desired action. Alternatively, the
system could highlight the recommended actions, keeping
all options on the screen, but also increasing the
complexity of the interface.
In the second study we explored these parameters by
testing five different privacy recommenders against two
versions of the default system that just presents the full

list of sharing actions. In terms of evaluating these
recommenders, we focus on the following aspects:
How accurate is the recommender? Using offline
evaluations, previous work has shown relative success in
predicting users’ binary (yes/no) sharing decisions (cf.
Cranshaw, Mugan, and Sadeh, 2011; Toch, Cranshaw,
Drielsma, Tsai, Kelley, Springfield, Cranor, Hong, and
Sadeh, 2010). Our recommender has to predict among 8
actions though, which is considerably harder. Moreover,
offline accuracy evaluations do not always agree with
online
evaluations
(McNee,
Albert,
Cosley,
Gopalkrishnan, Lam, Rashid, Konstan, and Riedl, 2002).
We thus purposefully evaluate the accuracy of our
recommender in an online evaluation.
Is the recommender persuasive? Merely calling an item a
recommendation may increase the chances that users
choose it (Cremonesi, Garzotto, and Turrin, 2012; Pathak,
Garfinkel, Gopal, Venkatesan, and Yin, 2010). This
would result in accuracy levels that are even higher than
predicted based on study 1, especially when the
recommender hides the other actions.
Does the recommender increase satisfaction? Accurate
recommenders are not always more satisfying to the user,
and researchers have thus called for a more comprehensive, subjective evaluation of recommender systems
(Knijnenburg, Willemsen, Gantner, Soncu, and Newell,
2012). Recommenders may give users a sense that they
are helped (Häubl and Trifts, 2000), but they must leave
users enough freedom to make their own decisions
(Pariser, 2012). Moreover, inaccurate recommendations
may be perceived as nefarious (Fitzsimons and Lehmann,
2004), which in our case may manifest itself as privacy
threat and reduced trust. We thus evaluate the recommender with a comprehensive post-study questionnaire
that measures users’ subjective evaluations.
Procedure

We recruited 368 participants using Amazon Mechanical
Turk (166 females, median age group: 26-30). Each
participant was assigned to one of 7 conditions and asked
to use a mock-up of HotSpots to choose a sharing action
for 10 scenarios (same as in study 1). They then answered
a questionnaire to evaluate their subjective experience.
Measurement

The 22 questionnaire items were submitted to a confirmatory factor analysis to measure 5 factors: perceived decision freedom, perceived decision help from the system,
perceived threat from the system, trust in the company,
and satisfaction with the system (see Knijnenburg and Jin
(2013) for measurement properties).
Experimental conditions

We developed 5 versions of the privacy recommender
(see Figure 1), to be tested against 2 baseline conditions
(resulting in a total of 7 between-subjects conditions):
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Figure 1. Mockups of the recommenders used to test conditions C2-C6.

1
2
3
4
5

C2: Long list,
C3: Short list, C4: One item, C5: Short list,
rest hidden
rest hidden
rest hidden
highlighted
98.7%
92.2%
75.0%
86.6%
Recall in study 2
95.1%
81.5%
42.8%
81.5%
Recall in study 1 (ex-post)
87.3%
67.3%
36.0%
67.3%
Recall based on C1, study 2
5.03, p < .001
2.80, p < .001
5.20, p < .001
1.46, p = .107
Odds ratio line 1 and 2
16.7, p < .001
7.51, p < .001
7.23, p < .001
3.93, p < .001
Odds ratio line 1 and 3
Table 2. Recall in the 5 recommender conditions (C2−C6).

C1. No recommendation: Regardless of the users’
evaluation, all sharing actions are displayed (this is
the “comparable baseline” condition).
C2. Long list, rest hidden: The dark gray and light gray
actions from Table 1 are listed as “recommended options”; the rest is hidden under a “more options” link.
C3. Short list, rest hidden: The dark gray actions from
Table 1 are recommended; the rest is hidden.
C4. One item, rest hidden: Only the most popular action
for that evaluation is displayed, the rest is hidden.
C5. Short list, highlighted: All actions are displayed, but
the dark gray actions from Table 1 are highlighted.
C6. One item, highlighted: All actions are displayed, but
the most popular for that evaluation is highlighted.
C7. No evaluation: Same as C1, but the user does not
evaluate the activity (this is the “optimized baseline”
condition, because no evaluation is needed if the
system is not using it for recommendations).

C6: One item,
highlighted
62.5%
42.8%
36.0%
2.55, p < .001
3.55, p < .001

the recommenders that hide items have a higher recall
than the recommenders that highlight items. The “rest
hidden” recommenders are thus more persuasive than the
“highlighted” recommenders (more on persuasion below).
This is likely due to the additional effort it takes in these
systems to select an option that is not initially listed.
User behavior

Line 2 of Table 2 shows the recall when applied ex-post
to the study 1 data. Ex-post recall is high “by design”,
because the recommenders were derived from this data. In
comparison, line 3 tests the robustness of the recommenders by testing them on the “new” data of the C1 condition.
The fact that the recall based on C1 data is lower than the
ex-post recall indicates that we slightly over-fitted the
recommenders to the behavior of the study 1 participants.

In every condition (except for C7), the system first asks
the user to evaluate the activity using one of 7 options1.
Each recommender then tailors the display of the 8
sharing actions to the selected evaluation.

Interestingly, though, the “actual” recall in the recommender conditions (line 1) is higher than the ex-post
recall (line 2): the mere fact that certain options were presented as “recommendations” increased their likelihood to
be chosen. In other words, the system persuaded
participants to choose one of the recommended actions.

Results

Subjective evaluations

Recommendation accuracy

Participants’ behavior was influenced by the recommenders, but what about their subjective evaluations? Figure 2
compares the recommenders (C2–C6) against the two
baseline conditions (C1 and C7) in terms of perceived
decision freedom, perceived decision help, perceived
threat, trust in the company, and system satisfaction.

The first line in Table 2 shows the recall of each recommender: the proportion of decisions that were in line with
the recommended action. As expected, longer lists have a
higher recall, but the short lists perform particularly well
given the lower number of recommendations. Moreover,
1

We combined E2/E4, E6/E10, and E7/E9 because they
were similar evaluations and also showed very similar
behavior (see Table 1).

Temporarily ignoring the optimized baseline (C7), we
observe the following: Although the recommenders result
in somewhat lower (yet not significantly lower) perceived
decision freedom, they do result in somewhat higher
perceived decision help, especially the “short list, rest
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hidden” recommender (C3), which is perceived as
significantly more helpful than the baseline system
without recommendations (C1; β = −.483, p = .025). The
recommenders also result in slightly lower perceived
threat, and C3 seems to instill some trust in the company
(albeit not significantly: β = .305, p = .118). In terms of
system satisfaction, the recommenders are on par with C1.

the rest (C3) is perceived as more helpful than a system
that just presents all 8 sharing actions (C1). The fact that
this recommender is both persuasive and regarded as
helpful gives credence to the idea that recommendations
are adaptive defaults: they facilitate the decision process
by nudging users towards an option that meets their needs
(Smith, Goldstein, and Johnson, 2013).

Returning to the optimized baseline, Figure 2 shows that
this system has a significantly higher decision freedom
(β = .449, p = .040), higher decision help (β = .465,
p = .021), lower threat (β = −.429, p = .038), and higher
satisfaction (β = .455, p = .022) than baseline C1. The
difference between C7 and the other conditions is that
participants in C7 are not asked to evaluate the described
activity before choosing a sharing action. This poses an
interesting dilemma: Although a recommendation (i.e.,
C3) can increase the perceived decision help, asking for
the evaluation that is necessary to give such a
recommendation actually ruins the positive effect of the
recommendation itself. Asking for an evaluation thus
thwarts the positive effect of the recommender system.

Recent studies show that users’ sharing behavior can be
influenced by subtle changes in the decision environment
(Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein, 2012; John, Acquisti,
and Loewenstein, 2011; Knijnenburg, Kobsa, and Jin,
2013), and our current results corroborate these findings.
Highlighting certain options makes them more likely to be
chosen, and hiding the other options results in an even
stronger persuasive effect. Taking this practice one step
further, one could even remove certain sharing options
altogether. Knijnenburg et al. (2013) show that in that
case users’ choices among the remaining options will be
subject to well-known decision context effects.

CONCLUSION

This paper explored ways to help users of LSS to choose
among a several sharing actions. Study 1 showed that
users’ evaluation of their activity is a good predictor of
their sharing behavior. Study 2 explored a number of
“privacy recommenders” that tailor the list of sharing
actions to the selected evaluation. Our results show that
these recommendations are indeed accurate. In fact, we
found that the recommenders were persuasive: users were
disproportionally more likely to choose a recommended
sharing action over an action that was not recommended.
Companies can use this persuasive power to influence
users’ behavior through recommendations (Cremonesi et
al., 2012). Note, however, that recommending items that
the user clearly does not like is likely to result in
reactance (behavior that explicitly counters the
recommended action) and lower satisfaction (Fitzsimons
and Lehmann, 2004). This argument is in line with
Wilson et al. (2013), who also warn that the subset of
available sharing options has to be “carefully considered”
because it “can influence users to share significantly more
without a substantial difference in comfort”.
In terms of subjective evaluations, the recommenders did
not have a very large impact, although the recommender
that presents a short list of recommendations and hides
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6

Freedom

0.8

Help

The fact that our recommenders did not increase user
satisfaction presents two opportunities for future research.
The first is to explore alternative ways to support location
sharing that balance privacy and usability. Finding the
optimal level of control is of key importance here:
increased control can help to reduce users’ perceptions of
privacy risk, but it can at the same time overwhelm the
user (Compañó and Lusoli, 2010). Carefully designing the
sharing options is a good initial step in this direction (cf.
Knijnenburg et al., 2013). The other opportunity is to find
a way to recommend sharing actions without explicitly
asking the user to evaluate the activity. For example, it
may be possible to “extract” the evaluation of the activity
from a status update. Alternatively, users’ previous
sharing actions at similar locations may be used (cf.
Threat

0.6

0.8

Trust

0.6

0

0.4

0.4

-0.2

0.2

0.4

0.2

-0.4

0

0.2

0

-0.6

-0.2

0

-0.2
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7

0.2

The recommenders did not improve the usability of our
LSS over the optimized baseline (C7). This reduces the
practical applicability of our results, but it highlights that
an adaptive privacy system, no matter how accurate,
needs to be accepted by users as well (cf. Knijnenburg et
al., 2012). In this specific case, the initial premise that
evaluating the activity is easier than choosing a sharing
action could be false. Alternatively, by asking users to
evaluate the rather “risqué” scenarios, we may have inadvertently alerted them of the dangers of location-sharing.
Luckily, day-to-day location sharing rarely involves such
extreme scenarios, and this “inadvertent awareness effect”
would thus arguably be smaller in reality.

-0.8
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7

-0.4
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7

Satisfaction

0.6

-0.2
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7

C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7

Figure 6. The effect of the recommenders (C2–C6) on subjective measures. Because factor scores have no inherent scale, the
measures are fixed to zero at C1, and scaled in sample standard deviations. The error bars are ±1 SE of the comparison with C1.
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Cranshaw et al., 2011; Toch et al., 2010). Regardless, the
findings presented in this paper show that the idea of
recommending sharing actions to reduce the decision
burden on the user is worthy of further exploration.
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